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Non technical summary
Knowing whether fluctuations in the industrialized world are similar, understanding their sources and characterizing their time variations is important for both academics and policymakers. From an academic point of view one is interested in knowing whether business cycle links are the result of cross countries interdependencies or common shocks. Hence, one may welcome studies empirically documenting similarities in economic fluctuations since the presence of a common cycle facilitates the study of the relationship between national and international policy decisions and the state of the world economy. Policymakers monitoring domestic or regional cycles are typically concerned with the effect of national idiosyncrasies and with the consequences that their actions have on the working of international markets. However, if variations in economic activity in countries with different institutions, economic structures or economic policies are driven by a common cause, markets more than policies are the key to understanding the comovements in economic activity. Moreover, national or regional policies designed to counteract world tendencies may be ineffective. Finally, structural time variations may undermine the usefulness of policies which may have been effective in the past.
This paper breaks ground in the area by explicitly addressing three interrelated questions. First, we ask whether G-7 cycles are driven by a common world cycle or if there is a significant national component in the fluctuations. If the former is the case, we would like to know what are the features of the world cycle and what drives it. Second, we are curious as to whether there is any evidence that Euro cycles are different from those we observe in the rest of the G-7 or if they have become so in the recent past. Third, we would like to know whether there has been any tendency for G-7 cycles to become more similar in the 1990s or if, on the contrary, they tend to be clustered along geographical, regional or other institutional characteristics.
To study these questions we employ a panel VAR model of the type developed in Canova and Ciccarelli (2002) . Their approach is useful in our international business cycle context for at least two reasons. First, the econometric methodology is designed for large scale dynamic models displaying unit specific dynamics and cross country lagged interdependencies and it is flexible enough to allow for time variations in the correlation structure of cyclical fluctuations across variables and countries. Second, the parsimonious parametrization they propose endogenously produces an index structure where indicators of world and national specific cycles are recursively constructed and dynamically span cross country interdependencies. Therefore the specification is particularly suited to study the interrelationships and the structural changes present in G-7 cycles and to analyze what drives the common and the idiosyncratic components of G-7 fluctuations.
Five major results emerge from our investigation. First, we find that the common (world) indicator accounts for a significant portion of the fluctuations in sales, industrial production, output and employment of the seven most industrialized countries -roughly speaking, about 30 percent. Therefore, as in Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) or Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003), we find evidence of a significant world business cycle. We also show that this cyclical indicator captures the more persistent portions of the fluctuations in the G-7 and that it has more information than simple average or principal component measures obtained using G-7 GDPs or IPs. Second, we find that country specific indicators are useful in explaining certain GDP and employment episodes across time, but not in tracking the cyclical movements of the four variables in the G-7 over the entire sample.
Third, we do not find evidence of structural breaks in the country indicators in the 1990s: the often cited idea that national cycles are disappearing finds no support from our analysis. These indicators appear to be as significant in explaining the differential growth rate in GDP across countries in the mid 1990s as they were in the mid 1980s and, if anything, slightly more important. These last two results taken together imply that movements in the world indicator have been the stable and consistent reason for the commonalities of the fluctuations in the G-7 economies over time and that structural breaks in both the pattern of transmission across countries and in the sources of structural shocks are probably absent.
Fourth, we find little support for the idea that Euro cycles are different from those of the rest of the world or that a Euro area cycle is emerging in the 1990s. This result should be contrasted with Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Artis et al. (2003) who instead detected the presence of a EU cycle using IP data. Our analysis shows that the Euro signal is much weaker when one considers a broader set of variables and that regional causes have minor explanatory power for G-7 fluctuations throughout the sample. Fifth, we find that both world and country specific fluctuations are much more synchronized in contractions than expansions. That is, the uncertainty surrounding estimates of both world and country specific indicators is an order of magnitude smaller in the former than in the latter. Expansions tend to have large idiosyncratic components, both across variables and countries, while declines in economic activity have common timing and similar dynamics, both within and across countries.
Introduction
There is abundant evidence that economic activity in developed countries share a number of characteristics. For example, the real business cycle literature has demonstrated that macroeconomic fluctuations across countries are closely linked (see e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995), Baxter (1995) , Canova and Marrinan (1998) ) while more structured time series analyses have shown that a large portion of regional and country specific fluctuations are common (see e.g. Gregory et al.(1997) , del Negro (2000) , Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Kose et al. (2003) ) and that a number of linear and non-linear business cycle features among industrialized economies are similar (Harding and Pagan (2002) ). Although all existing evidence suggests the presence of a common source of fluctuations in developed countries, results are typically derived using restrictive or conventional assumptions about the nature of the dynamic relationships.
In fact, except for Del Negro (2000) or Kose et al. (2003) , the issue of whether commonalities are present or not is examined within an empirical framework which does not explicitly allow for cross-country and cross-variables interdependencies.
Recently, the stability of the cross-country business cycle relationships has come under scrutiny. For example, Doyle and Faust (2002) and Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) suggest that the increase in cyclical synchronization observed after 2000 in the advanced economies is the result of common shocks. This apparently represents a major shift relative to the 1980s where the increased similarities in macroeconomic fluctuations were the result of improved trade relationships (see e.g. Canova and Dellas (1992), Rose and Frankel (2000) ). It also represents a somewhat different propagation mechanism from the one used to explain the transmission of US shocks to Asia (see Mackowiak (2003) ) or Latin America (Canova (2001) there is any evidence that Euro cycles are different from those we observe in the rest of the G-7 or if they have become so in the recent past. Third, we would like to know whether there has been any tendency for G-7 cycles to become more similar in the 1990s or if, on the contrary, they tend to be clustered along geographical, regional or other institutional characteristics.
To study these questions we employ a panel VAR model of the type developed in Canova and Ciccarelli (2002) . Their approach is useful in our international business cycle context for at least two reasons. First, the econometric methodology is designed for large scale dynamic models displaying unit specific dynamics and cross country lagged interdependencies and it is flexible enough to allow for time variations in the correlation structure of cyclical fluctuations across variables and countries. Second, the parsimonious parametrization they propose endogenously produces an index structure where indicators of world and national specific cycles are recursively constructed and dynamically span cross country interdependencies. Therefore the specification is particularly suited to study the interrelationships and the structural changes Five major results emerge from our investigation. First, we find that the common (world)
indicator accounts for a significant portion of the fluctuations in sales, industrial production, we find evidence of a significant world business cycle. We also show that this cyclical indicator captures the more persistent portions of the fluctuations in the G-7 and that it has more information than simple average or principal component measures obtained using G-7 GDPs or IPs. Second, we find that country specific indicators are useful in explaining certain GDP and employment episodes across time, but not in tracking the cyclical movements of the four variables in the G-7 over the entire sample. Third, we do not find evidence of structural breaks in the country indicators in the 1990s: the often cited idea that national cycles are disappearing finds no support from our analysis. These indicators appear to be as significant in explaining the differential growth rate in GDP across countries in the mid 1990s as they were in the That is, the uncertainty surrounding estimates of both world and country specific indicators is an order of magnitude smaller in the former than in the latter. Expansions tend to have large idiosyncratic components, both across variables and countries, while declines in economic activity have common timing and similar dynamics, both within and across countries.
We attempt to characterize the informational content of the indicators we construct using simple correlation analysis. We document that the indicator captures a variety of influences going from the magnitude of world trade, to the behavior of commodity prices, to the stance of monetary policy in the G-7 and to the spending power of consumers. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the model specification, the technique used to construct the various indicators and the details of our testing approach. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.
The Panel VAR Model
The empirical model we consider has the form:
where i = 1; :::; N refers to countries and t = 1; :::; T to time. y it is a G × 1 vector for each country i and Y t = (y 0 1t ; y 0 2t ; : : : y 0 Nt ) 0 . D it;j are G × G matrices for each lag j, c it is a G × 1 vector of intercepts and e it is a G × 1 vector of random disturbances. We assume that there are p lags for the G endogenous variables.
Whenever D it (L) is not block diagonal, the model displays cross-unit lagged interdependencies. Lagged cross-country interdependencies add considerable realism to the specification but it is costly: the number of parameters is greatly increased (we have now k = NGp + 1 parameters in each equation). (1) displays two other important features. First, the coefficients are allowed to vary over time. Second, the dynamic relationships are allowed to be unit specific.
All three ingredients are crucial when one wants to study similarities, time variations in the transmission of business cycles across countries.
It is convenient to rewrite (1) in a simultaneous equations format:
where
: : : ; Y 0 t−p ; 1) , ± t = (± 0 1t ; : : : ; ± 0 N t ) 0 and ± it are Gk × 1 vectors containing, stacked, the G rows of the matrix D it and c it , while Y t and E t are NG × 1 vectors containing the endogenous variables and the random disturbances.
Since ± t varies with cross-sectional units in different time periods, it is impossible to estimate it using classical methods. Two shortcuts are typically employed: it is assumed that the coefficient vector does not depend on the unit, apart from a time invariant fixed effect, or 2001)). Neither of these assumptions is appealing in our study. Instead, we assume that ± t can be factored as: (3) into (2) we have
where From an economic point of view, the decomposition in (4) is convenient since it naturally allows us to assess the relative importance of world and country specific influences for fluctuations in Y t . In fact, W LI t = W t¸t plays the role of a world indicator, while CLI t = A t ® t plays the role of a country specific indicator. Note that both indicators are leading Y t as they reflect information contained in the predetermined variables of the VAR and can be constructed in real time and recursively. Finally, note that while we treat (3) as a part of the prior, it can be also thought as a part of the model specification. If little prior information on¸t; ® t ; ½ t is employed, then the small sample distributions for WLI and CLI we obtained are the same as those obtained with classical methods on a model composed of (2) and (3).
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The structure of time variations
Write (3) compactly as:
and V is a k × k matrix and let
We assume that Σ = Ω and V = ¾ 2 I k , where ¾ 2 is known; that B t =°1 * B t−1 +°2 * B = » t * B,
(1−°1) where°1;°2 are known; thatB = diag(B 1 ;B 2 ;B 3 ), and that E t , u t and´t are mutually independent In (6) the factors evolve over time as a random walk. Alternative specifications allowing for more complex dynamics or exchangeability across units are possible (see e.g. Canova and Ciccarelli (2002)). We stick to this simple setup since experimentation with more complicated structures did not produce qualitatively important changes in the results. The spherical assumption on V reflects the fact that the factors are measured in common units, while setting Ω = Σ is standard in the literature (see e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) ). The variance of the innovations in µ t is allowed to be time varying to account for heteroskedasticity and other generic volatility clustering that may appear in the coefficients of several, or all, series within and across units. Note that time invariant structures (°1 =°2 = 0), and homoskedastic variance (°1 = 0 and°2 = 1) are special cases of the assumed process. The block diagonality ofB is needed to guarantee the orthogonality across factors, which is preserved a-posteriori, and hence their identifiability. Finally, independence among the errors is standard.
To summarize, the model we will use in our exercises has the hierarchical structure:
To compute posterior distributions we need prior densities for (Ω; ¾ t ;B). Because we want to minimize the impact of prior choices on the posterior distribution of the indicators, we specify rather loose priors. The exact form of these priors, the numerical approach used to compute posterior distributions and the details of the computations are provided in appendix A. 
Verifying the hypotheses of interest
To evaluate the posterior support for the three main issues of interest in the paper, i.e. whether G-7 cycles are driven by a common world cycle; whether there has been any tendency for G-7
cycles to become more similar in the 1990s and whether cycles in the Euro area are different from those in the other G-7 countries or have become so in the 1990s, we employ two types of evidence. First, we examine the behavior of the posterior distribution of W LI t and of CLI t over time. Second, we compare the out-of-sample forecasting performances of restricted and unrestricted specifications. Since the model has a natural leading indicator structure, we will also examine the posterior support for the three hypotheses by comparing the predictive ability of unrestricted and restricted specifications. Predictive distributions can be compared using Bayes factors which are equivalent to the posterior odds ratios when equal a priori weight is given to alternative models (analog of likelihood ratio tests in our context). The predictive Bayes factor is Real GDP data is measured in constant 1995 prices, except for Canada (the base year is 1997). The Japanese series starts only in 1980 and has been extended backwards using the real GDP series measured in constant 1990 prices. Similarly, the Canadian real GDP was extended backwards from 1981 using real GDP data with base-year 1992. The source of all data is from the Quarterly National Accounts of OECD, except for Germany whose real GDP comes from the Bundesbank database. We prefer this series since it explicitly takes into account the effects This is important since the procedure cannot distinguish if a 2% growth is generated in the countries with a large level (say, the US) or with a smaller one (say, Canada).
We have conducted a number of specification searches to decide the structure of the model. A summary of these exercises appears in Appendix B. Overall, we found that a model which displays lagged cross country interdependencies and time variations in the factors, where the decomposition in (3) includes three elements and V is nondegenerate is preferable to specifications which exclude these features. We would like to emphasize two important aspects of Second, time variations in the factors play some role but not a very large one.
To demonstrate the ability of the model to approximate the data we present three types of statistics. In table 1 we report the Theil-U statistics (the ratio of the one step ahead MSE computed using the median of the posterior of our model to the one step ahead MSE of a naive no-change univariate model) for IP and employment growth of the 7 countries. We choose to confront the forecast of our model to those of a no-change model because more complicated specifications, e.g. a VAR (with or without a prior) fail to improve over the no-change model for these two variables. Clearly, the smaller the reported numbers, the larger is the forecasting improvement of our model. The statistics are reported for two types of prior assumptions, a non informative and an informative one. Results for the latter are slightly better, as expected when more information is used. Nevertheless, we prefer the non informative prior, which avoids interference with the data and does not condition much the results. Subsequent discussion and figures are therefore based on the non informative set-up. The values of the hyperparameters under the two types of priors are reported in the appendix. Figure 1 reports the predicted recursive one-step ahead 68 percent central posterior bands (dotted lines) together with the actual growth rates (solid line) for UK GDP growth, US employment growth and Japan IP growth. We choose these three series because the performance of the model for them is close to the median outcome in the sense that they were neither the best not the worst tracked by our specification. In figure 2 , we report the record of turning point probabilities for US, UK, Canada and Germany GDP in levels. Probabilities of turning points are generated calculating the percentage of times our model generates the pattern predicted by the following simple rule: there is an upturn at t if gdp t−2 < gdp t−1 < gdp t > gdp t+1 > gdp t+2 and there is a downturn if gdp t−2 > gdp t−1 > gdp t < gdp t+1 < gdp t+2 . While this rule is extremely simple and does not make the provision for minimum length of a cycle or for consecutive turning point signals as, for example, the Table 1 shows that one-step ahead forecast for employment growth are slightly better than those for IP growth (which is considerably more volatile). However, for both series in all countries, our model is superior to the alternative. Gains are, on average, of the order of 20%
for IP growth and exceed 25% for employment growth. Note also that the model appears to be particularly suited to forecast Euro area variables. We use a Diebold and Mariano (1995) test to check for the asymptotic significance of the gain vis-a-vis a no-change univariate model:
we confirm that the forecasts of the two models are different and that those of our model are better.
The forecasting ability of the model can also be graphically appreciated in figure 1 While our model is designed to capture the features of cycles in the growth rates, it can also reproduce quite well turning points in the level of GDP of several of the G-7 countries. To explicitly evaluate the contribution of country indicators to cyclical fluctuations in the G-7 economies, we plot in figure 4 the growth rate of GDP (xxGDPG, where xx is the acronym of the country), the median value of W LI t (WLI) and the median value of W LI t +CLI t for each country (WCLI xx). Sizeable differences between the two indicators will emerge when country specificities are of relevance. One can observe that in the US, Japan and Canada, country spe- To formally examine whether G-7 cycles are similar, we compare the predictive ability of two models: one without country specific components (M i ) and one which includes them (M j ). The predictive Bayes factor is 0.90 suggesting that country indicators have some role in explaining the dynamics of the data. To understand the meaning of this number, note that one should have a prior odds in excess of 1.11 (attributing 0.53 or more a-priori probability on the model without country specific indicators) to have mild posterior evidence against the existence of country specific cycles. The predictive power of country specific indicators comes almost entirely from the mentioned above episodes. In fact, if we repeat the exercise using only data for the 1990s
Bayes factor drops to 0.86, suggesting a higher role for the country component. 2003)). We settled on the above specification since Bayes factors always preferred it and, in both cases, by a large margin. even though one extra degree of freedom is gained, the uncertainty in the estimates is so large that the predictive ability does not necessarily improve.
While the lack of a Euro area cycle may appear surprising, it is worth stressing that our finding is not unique. Since our approach is a reduced form one, we can not tell whether these difference are due to the structural reasons or to increased idiosyncrasies over expansion phases. Third, we find little support for the idea that Euro are cycles are different from those of the rest of the world or that a Euro area cycle is emerging in the 1990s. Overall, regional causes appear to be of minor importance in explaining G-7 cycles.
What drives the World indicator?
Before we discuss the informational content of our world indicator, we first examine how it is related to simple arithmetic averages of GDP, IP, employment or sales growth in the G-7. If the behavior of the world indicator we construct can be reproduced with such simple measures, our more complicated setup can be clearly dismissed. We find that such measures share some informational content with our indicator but the overlap is far from perfect. In fact, the point To study the informational content of the world indicator we computed a number of simple correlations. Since these correlations are non-structural they are only as suggestive of the possible sources of cyclical movements captured by our world indicator. We have computed correlations with the growth rate of the US real personal non-agricultural income, the growth rate of world commodity price index, the NYSE stock return index, the growth rate of the world market crude petroleum price, the growth rate of the world goods trade, the quarterly US technology shock extracted by Gali, López-Salido and Vallés (2003), the average spread between US and other G-7 short term interest rates, both real and nominal, the average growth rates of real private consumption to GDP ratio, real effective exchange rates and M3, and average G-7 government deficit.
Is the world indicator a stand-in for oil shocks, technology shocks or other types of supply indicator and commodity prices is significant 2 although not very large (point estimate 0.27), the one of oil prices and US technology shocks is small and insignificant (point estimates 0.05 and -0.05). Similarly, the correlation with real exchange rates is low and insignificant. Therefore, while oil shocks may be an important source of national disturbances, and technology shocks in the US may explain an important portion of US fluctuations, it is necessary to go beyond these disturbances to explain and interpret existing world business cycles. Cochrane (1994) we find that the consumption/output ratio is almost as good as any other variables in explaining common movements in the G-7.
In sum, our world indicator captures a number of influences (trade, commodity prices, monetary policy, spending capacity) that analysts and academic investigators have indicated to be important to understand the dynamics of business cycles in the industrialized world.
One possible explanations for the remarkable stability in its explanatory power may be that it robustly and flexibly captures different sources of fluctuations by allowing for time variations and adaptive changes in the weights.
There are another couple of other interesting facts which our investigation has discovered.
First, there seems to be a strong negative relationship between the average explanatory power of the world indicator for national cycles and volatility of GDP (see figure 6 ). Such a relationship is at times studied in growth literature to evaluate the desirability of stable growth. In our context, this patterns implies that synchronicity with the rest of the G-7 improves (worsens) as the volatility of domestic GDP fluctuations is reduced (increases). Second, the world indicator has larger explanatory power for employment than output (and larger correlation with the average employment growth than with average GDP growth). This result squares well with those derived by the international RBC literature where employment correlations larger than 2 Here and in the following significance means that the 95 percent band around the point estimate does not include zero. We have also attempted to identify the informational content of country specific indicators. We have correlated them with the individual series used in the model (the growth rate of real GDP, industrial production, employment and real retail sales) as well as with other domestic variables like the 3 month interbank nominal interest rate, the nominal yield on 10year bonds, the real short term and long term interest rates, the growth rate of M3, the general government deficit, the consumption output ratio and the real exchange rate and with a few other international variables (the US personal income, the commodity price index, the US technology disturbances, US stock returns). We found that US personal income is significantly correlated with all the country specific indicators. Among the other variables, short term interest rates (either nominal or real) or money growth are those most correlated with the indicators. Interestingly, the informational content of national indicators is not related to the stance of fiscal policy in any country nor to the local consumption to GDP ratio, except in Canada. We address three interrelated questions. First, we ask whether G-7 cycles are driven by a common world cycle or if there is a significant national component in the fluctuations.
Second, we examine whether Euro area cycles are different from those we observe in the rest of the G-7 or if they have become so in the recent past. Third, we study whether there has been any tendency for G-7 cycles to become more similar in the 1990s or if, on the contrary, they tend to be clustered along geographical, regional or other institutional characteristics.
Five major results emerge from our investigation. First, we find that the common (world) indicator accounts for a significant portion of the fluctuations in sales, industrial production, Furthermore, since the model tracks reasonably well the four macroeconomic variables used in this study, one may want see whether this ability translates also in useful predictions of the future state of the world economy at various horizons. The results reported in Table 1 for forecasting in short horizons are promising. The exercises conducted in Canova and Ciccarelli (2002) suggest that this could be the case using information available up to one or two years in advance, but more evidence is clearly needed. We plan to take up all these questions in future work. here µ * t|t−1 =μ t−1|t−1 ; and R * t|t−1 =R t−1|t−1 + B t . The prior distribution on Ω is standard and can be made uninformative by letting Q 1 → 0. The priors for b i and ¾ t are general and can be made uninformative letting $ 0 ,± 0 → 0 and ³ → 0 respectively. The prior assumption on ¾ t implies that the prior for v t has the form (v t |¾ t ) ∼ N (0; ¾ t Ω) where ¾ t ∼ Inv-Â 2 (³; s t ). That is, v t is distributed as a multivariate t centered at 0, with scale matrix dependent on Ω and degrees of freedom equal to ³: Such a prior has the potential to account for unusual observations in the data or occasional extreme parameter values which occur in our sample because of structural breaks (for example, the breakdown of the EMU) or unexpected events (German unification). Finally, the prior on µ t can be derived from normal initial conditions and the Kalman filter.
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We collect the hyperparameters of the prior in the vector 
A.2 Posterior distributions
To calculate the posterior distribution of the unknowns of the model (Ã = (Ω; b i ; {¾ t } t ; {µ t } t ) ; we combine the above priors with the likelihood of the data, which, with the specification adopted, is proportional to whereμ t|t andR t|t are the one-period-ahead forecasts of µ t and the variance-covariance matrix of the forecast error, respectively, calculated by the Kalman Filter as:
and µ i t is the i th -subvector of µ, with i = 1; 2. Using posterior draws, the posterior distributions of¸t and ® t can be estimated using kernel methods and, in turns, the posterior distributions of W LI t and CLI t and/or the posterior distribution of the importance of the common components in explaining cyclical fluctuations can be obtained. For example, the posterior mean of W LI can be approximated by 1 H P h W t¸h t and a credible 68% interval can be obtained ordering the draws of W LI h t for each t. Because we are not directly sampling from the posterior, it is important to monitor that the Markov chain induced by the sampler converges to the ergotic (posterior) distribution.
We have check convergence in several ways: increasing the length of the chain, splitting the chain in two after a burn-in period and calculating whether the mean and the variances are similar; checking if cumulative means settle at some value. The result we present are based on chains with 24000 draws: 600 blocks of 40 draws were made and the last draw for each block is retained after the discarding the first 4000. This means that a total of 500 draws is used at each t to conduct posterior inference. We have also examined the performance of a model with three vectors of indicators (a world, a country specific and a variable specific) against a model with only a world and country specific indicators. The Bayes factor in this case is 1.02, suggesting that the contribution of the third vector of indices is small. In economic terms this means that the dynamics of the four variables of the system are relatively similar, a comforting result since sales, employment, industrial production were chosen because they were suspected to be sufficiently coincident with GDP not only in the US (as the NBER practice indicates) but also in the other G-7
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countries. 
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